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wind and overstepped the bounds of judicial interpretation by intruding upon
the legislative decision process.
Although the instant case dealt only with micro-organisms, its reasoning
might be extended to more complex organisms. Patentability of living organisms may be limited by other statutory requirements. More complex organisms presumably will not be able to meet the required written description of
section 112 .7 With micro-organisms, however, this burden is met by merely
depositing a culture in a Department of Agriculture depository. 7s As the statutory requirements are overcome, the instant decision would preclude the rejection of any patent claims solely because the organism is alive.
If the instant decision is followed, it is difficult to perceive what would not
be patentable subject matter. The Court leaves unclear the extent of modification necessary for a living organism to be patentable. The instant decision may
have been a calculated effort by the Court to bring to Congress' attention the
need for legislation in this area of the law. Although the Supreme Court has
opened the door to this type of patent, it may be closed just as easily by the
legislature. Because legislative action would be the best solution, perhaps the
Court's decision was justified.
GARRY JOHNSON

WORKERS' COMPENSATION: A NEW STANDARD
FOR WORK CONNECTEDNESS
Strother v. MorrisonCafeteria, 383 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 1980)
A cafeteria cashier, who had on two occasions helped take the day's receipts
to the bank,' was assaulted and robbed 2 immediately upon arriving home after
precautions for recombinant DNA research, Senator Dale Bumpers of Arkansas, author of a
bill on the subject, S. 621, stated: "I am not convinced that there should be any patents
given - especially on new organisms or plasmids - until we have had more time to evaluate
the long-term implications of this technology." Recombinant DNA Regulation Act, 1977:

Hearing on S. 1217 Before the Subcomm. on Health and Scientific Res. of the Senate Comm.
on Human Resources, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 51 (April 6, 1977).
77. 35 U.S.C. §112 (1976). See note 42 supra. See, e.g., In re Merat, 519 F.2d 1390, 1396
(C.C.P.A. 1975) (rejection of claim for a dwarf hen resulting from selective breeding for
failure to fulfill specification requirements of § 112).
78. See In re Argoudelis, 434 F.2d 1390, 1393 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (deposit of antibiotic
producing micro-organisms in U.S. depository with prescribed description and design sufficient
to satisfy requirements of §112).
1. The claimant, Blanche Strother, was an employee of Morrison's Cafeteria. She worked
as a cashier collecting customers' payments everyday from mid-afternoon until closing at
9:00 p.m. Though handling money after closing was never part of her regular duties, she had
driven her manager to the bank twice to deposit the cafeteria's receipts. 383 So. 2d 623, 623
(Fla. 1980).
2. While the opinions relate that the claimant's purse was taken and that she was assaulted, the precise extent of her injury was not reported. 383 So. 2d at 624; Indus. Rel.
Comm'n Order 2-3647 at 2 (Jan. 12, 1979).
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work by a man demanding the "money or deposits."3 She recognized her assailant as one of two men she had seen loitering in the restaurant near closing
time on three consecutive nights, including the night of her injury.4 The judge
of industrial claims granted her workers' compensation claim, reasoning that
because of her trips to the bank she was exposed to more risk than a typical
cashier 5 and her injury was compensable under the statutory test of work connectedness: arising out of and in the course of employment.6 Reversing the
lower court, the Industrial Relations Commission 7 held the claimant's injury
was not sufficiently work-related because, while it may have arisen out of her
employment, it was not received while she was in the course and scope of her
employment.8 The Supreme Court of Florida reversed, reinstated the order of
3. 383 So. 2d at 624. When the petitioner left work on the night of her injury she was
not carrying any of her employer's money, but when her attacker said he wanted the "money
or deposits," she concluded that he was referring to the cafeteria's money. Id.
4. Id. The judge of industrial claims accepted her testimony that she had been followed
and attacked by one of the same men who were loitering in the cafeteria earlier that night.
The judge inferred from the attacker's demands that he believed the claimant was carrying
the restaurant's money and had gone home instead of to the bank. Id. The Industrial Relations Commission questioned these findings of fact but allowed them to stand because the
court found that the claimant was not entitled to compensation. Indus. Rel. Comm'n Order
2-3647 at 2-3.
5. 383 So. 2d at 624. The fact that petitioner had helped deposit the cafeteria's money on
two occasions may have led the judge of industrial claims to infer that she had been exposed
to greater risk than other cashiers. Indus. Rel. Comm'n Order 2-3647 at 2.
6. FLA. STAT. §440.02(6) (1979).
7. The 1979 Florida Legislature abolished the Industrial Relations Commission, FLA. STAT.x
§440.271 (1979), and made other significant changes to the Workers' Compensation Law,
chapter 440 of the Florida Statutes, such as conferring on the Supreme Court of Florida the
authority to adopt rules governing workers' compensation appeals. See FLA. STAT. §440.25(4)(f)
(1979); In re Florida Workers' Compensation Rules of Procedure, 374 So. 2d 981 (Fla. 1979).
While the basic requirement that an injury must arise out of and be in the course of employment remains unchanged, FrLA. STAT. §440.02(6), .09(1) (1979), some procedural requirements have been changed. All appeals shall now be made to the First District Court of Appeal,
in accordance with FLA. STAT. §440.271 (1979). Decisions by the First District Court of Appeal
are subject to review only by a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of
Florida. FA. STAT. §440.27(l) (1979).
8. Indus. Rel. Comm'n Order 2-3647 at 2-3. The use of "course and scope of employment"
may suggest a confusion between agency law and workers' compensation law, but it appears
the word "scope" was used merely to clarify "in the course of employment." This clarification
implicitly disallows injuries occurring while the employee is engaged in "banter and frolic."
See generally L. ALPERT, J. ALPERT & P. MURPHY,FLORIDA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAw §8.6
(3rd ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as L. ALPERT].
The Industrial Relations Commission viewed all inferences in the light most favorable to
claimant and still determined "the injury is not during working hours and not on the premises
of the employer so it fals." Indus. Rel. Comm'n Order 2-3647 at 2. The Commission held
that even if the claimant's assailants were after the cafeteria's money, only one-half of the
statutory requirement would be satisfied: the "arising out of" element. Id. Recognizing that
there was no precedent directly on point, the Commission looked to Fidelity & Cas. Co. of
N.Y. v. Moore, 143 Fla. 103, 196 So. 495 (1940), for the proposition that the statutory coverage
formula was conjunctive in that the injury must arise out of and be in the course of employment. The Commission then looked to 1 A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW §11.34
(1978), for affirmance. Relying on Larson, the Commission held that in a case of mistaken"
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the judge of industrial claims? and HELD, an injury is compensable if it arises
out of employment in the sense of causation and is in the course of employment
in the sense of continuity of time, space and circumstances. The latter requirement may be proven by showing that the causative factors occurred during the
time and space limits of employment.' 0
Basing its statute on the generally accepted English statute,"' Florida passed
its first Workmen's Compensation Act in 1935.12 Through the Act, the legislature sought to provide the worker and his family with predetermined, adequate
and prompt benefits,' 3 thereby reducing the expense of litigation, which was

often excessive under the common law's fault-based system of liability.' 4 In an
identity the employee must be within the "course and scope of" his employment to recover.
Indus. Rel. Comm'n Order 2-3647 at 3.
9. 383 So. 2d at 628.
10. Id.
11. FLORIDA INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW, V (1967)
(pamphlet published by the Florida Industrial Commission). The preface to the Act states
that the Florida Workers' Compensation Act is based on the English statute and the principles
embodied therein are equivalent. Most states have based their workers' compensation acts on
the British model. The typical state statute contains the operative language: "arising out of
and in the course of employment." Larson, The Nature and Origins of Workmen's Compensation, 37 CORNELL L. Q. 206, 206 (1952).
12. The Act was passed in three bills: 1935 Fla. Laws, ch. 17481 §§1-55 (current version
at FLA. STAT. §440.01 (1979)); 1935 Fla. Laws, ch. 17482 §§1-3 (current version at FLA. STAT.
§440.01 (1979)); 1935 Fla. Laws, ch. 17483 §§1-3 (current version at FLA. STAT. §440.02 (1979)).
13. The basic goal of workers' compensation is to provide for the worker and his family;
other justifications developed after enactment. H. SOMERS & A. SOMERS, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 26-27 (1954) [hereinafter cited as H. SOMERS]. Workers' compensation equalizes the extremes of high lump-sum judgments or no recovery with regular periodic installments. Since
the compensation is sure, injuries are not exacerbated by lack of medical attention, thereby
helping the worker to rejoin the labor force as soon as possible. Id. at 27-28.
14. Under the common law both liability and damages depended on a jury verdict. Id.
at 27. As a result, the economically more powerful employer was given great incentive to
delay as long as possible and to litigate every claim. The employer's superior bargaining
power enabled him to settle on his own terms by draining the injured employee's financial
reserves until the employee could no longer afford litigation and settled for a small sum.
Under workers' compensation, as many issues as possible are predetermined in hopes of
prompt settlement. To approach this ideal, both liability and damages must be explicit.
Sadowski, Herzog, Butler, & Gokel, The 1979 Florida Workers' Compensation Reform: Back
to Basics, 7 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 641, 642 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Sadowski].
The estimates of various commentators vary, but all agree that only a small percentage of
the total number of injured workers were ever compensated for their injuries under the
common law. IV. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS §80 (4th ed. 1971). Using German statistics,
Larson estimates that only about 17% of the victims of industrial accidents would even have
a remedy available to them under the common law. Larson, supra note 11, at 224-25. He
further states that the majority of these individuals would be unable to recover because they
would be either unable to prove their employer's fault or overcome the employer's defenses.
Id. at 225. Finally, the time and expense of litigation preclude many from bringing suit.
Sadowski, supra at 641. The common law is often noted for its adaptability, yet instead of
providing remedies for industrial accidents it decreased the number that were already available. Larson, supra note 11, at 223. This may have been partially a result of the individualistic
nature of the common law and the tort concept of personal fault proximately causing an injury. It may also be that the courts were not given enough time to adapt since changes were
made legislatively. Id. at 223-25.
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effort to ease the burden on the victims of industrial accidents, the new concept
of liability without fault 5 was introduced to transfer the cost of work-related
accidents from the worker to industry and ultimately to the consumer through
increased prices.' 6 To insure that industry only paid those costs associated with
employment,7 the statutory standard for causation, "arising out of and in the
course of employment," was adopted.'8 This "deceptively simple and litigiously
prolific phrase"'- was the heart of the statute and its interpretation has been
15. The English Act, as well as those in this country, revolved around the concept of
liability without fault. It was an entirely new approach which abandoned the individualistic
basis of the common law. Embodied in this concept was the elimination of litigation and a
recognition that there was no guilt associated with industrial accidents; they were considered
unavoidable. H. Soams, supra note 13, at 26-29. The tort principles of the common law,
proximate cause and fault, were completely abandoned under workers' compensation. FLA.
STAT. §440.10(2) (1979). It has been suggested that a fundamental problem with the operation
of workers' compensation is that judges too often confuse tort concepts of causation with the
concept of strict liability embodied in the phrase "arising out of and in the course of employment." Larson, supra note 11, at 207-08.
16. This theory of social insurance has been reaffirmed by the Supreme Court of Florida
as the fundamental goal of Florida's workers' compensation system. E.g., Port Everglades
Terminal Co. v. Canty, 120 So. 2d 596, 602 (Fla. 1960); Duff Hotel Co. v. Ficara, 150 Fla. 442,
445, 7 So. 2d 790, 791 (1942). Economists explain this theory as an attempt to reduce the
total cost of accidents. Professor Calabresi expresses this goal of secondary cost avoidance in
terms of loss distribution and loss allocation. See G. CALABRnsi, THE CoSrs OF AccmE rs 34-37
(1970). Some accident costs occur because of economic and social displacement. If only one
person bears the expense of an industrial accident he may have to downgrade his lifestyle, but
if the loss is shared by the community it is not likely to change one individual's lifestyle. Id.
at 39.
It appears that workers' compensation arose from a moral obligation to provide for the
ill-fated victims of accidents. Protectu Awning Shutter Co. v. Cline, 154 Fla. 30, 32, 16 So. 2d

342, 343 (1944). Larson explains that workers' compensation laws are a way of making a moral
choice as efficiently as possible. Larson, supra note 11, at 209-12. The rapid industrialization of
Western Europe and the United States produced an equally swift increase in the number of
work-related injuries. Since the number of remedies available at common law to the victims
of industrial accidents grew smaller as the need increased, an intolerable situation soon de-

veloped. Id. at 223-28. If an employee is injured not through the fault of his employer, he
cannot be compensated under the common law. Society then has three choices: it can let the
worker starve or beg, it can provide direct relief, or it can enact some form of workers' compensation. Allowing the disabled to starve has not been morally acceptable. Direct relief is
preferable to no relief but creates problems by stigmatizing the worker. Additionally, direct
relief has no connection with the injury so it does not deter future mishaps. Workers' compensation is manifestly the best of these three alternatives. It preserves the worker's selfrespect by categorizing him as a veteran of industry rather than a beggar. Also, since workers'
compensation benefits are based upon a causal connection between an injury and the
claimant's employment, there is some hope that workers' compensation will deter future
accidents. Id. at 209-10.
17. While workers' compensation is a system of liability without fault, it was never meant
to be general accident insurance. Protectu Awning Shutter Co. v. Cline, 154 Fla. 30, 31, 16
So. 2d 342, 343 (1944). Only those injuries resulting from employment are to be compensated.
Trail Builders Supply Co. v. Reagan, 235 So. 2d 482, 484 (Fla. 1970); General Properties Co.
v. Greening, 154 Fla. 814, 820, 18 So. 2d 908, 911 (1944).
18. This phrase originated in the British Workmen's Compensation Act. 60 & 61 Vict. c.
37 §1 (1897). Under this test, neither the negligence of the employee nor the fault of the
employer is at issue. Larson, supra note 11, at 208.
19. Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 330 U.S. 469,479 (1947).
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the major source of litigation in workers' compensation law from the statute's
inception.20 Although the Supreme Court of Florida has defined the phrase
many times, it has oscillated between disjunctive and conjunctive interpretations of the statute depending on the particular fact situation before it.21 The
disjunctive standard requires proof of either "arising out of employment" or
"in the course of employment" to satisfy the statutory test, while the conjunctive
rendering demands "arising out of employment" and "in the course of employment" be separately proven to permit compensation.
In 1940 the Florida supreme court made its first attempt to define the causation standard of the workers' compensation law in Fidelity & Casualty Co. of
New York v. Moore.22 The court interpreted the statute as embodying a disjunctive test, holding there must be either some causal connection between the
injury and the claimant's employment or the injury must have occurred during
work hours to permit compensation.3 In Moore, the decedent was killed in an
automobile accident while returning to his place of business after driving his
wife home.2 4 Although the decedent was on call twenty-four hours a day, the
20. "The few and seemingly simple words 'arising out of and in the course of employment' have been the fruitful (or fruitless) source of a mass of decisions turning upon nice
distinctions and supported by refinements so subtle as to leave the mind of the reader in a
maze of confusion." Herbert v. Fox & Co., I A.C. 405, 419 (1916). The problem with the
phrase, as with all strict liability systems, is that the theoretical framework for causation is
ill-defined. See G. CALABESI, supra note 16, at 3-67. If, as Larson suggests, the substance of
applying the work connectedness standard is delineating boundaries, Larson supra note 11, at
209, then it appears those boundaries are unclear. Note, Workmen's Compensation- Arising
out of and in the Course of an Enigma, 9 U. FLA. L. REv. 311, 313 (1956).
21. The supreme court has frequently based its decisions on factual categories rather than
the standard of work connectedness. See generally L. ALPERT, supra note 8. Soon after passage
of workers' compensation statutes in other jurisdictions, courts around the country began
classifying cases according to their fact situations. Subcategories and exceptions have developed
in each of these general categories, leading the United States Supreme Court to hold that the
facts particular to each case determine the injury's causal connection to the employment.
Cudahy Packing Co. v. Parramore, 263 U.S. 418, 424 (1923).
22. 143 Fla. 103, 196 So. 495 (1940).
23. The disjunctive standard the court adopted held: "'[I] there must be some causal
connection between the injury and the employment or [2] it must have had its origin in some
risk incidental to or connected with the employment or that [3] it flowed from it as a natural
consequence. Another definition widely approved is that [4] the injury must occur within the
period of the employment, at a place where the employee may reasonably be, and while he is
reasonably fulfilling the duties of his employment or engaged in doing something incidental to
it.' (Emphasis supplied.)" Hill v. Gregg, Gibson &cGregg, Inc., 260 So. 2d 193, 195 (Fla. 1972)
(quoting from Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N.Y. v. Moore, 143 Fla. at 105, 196 So. at 496). This
ambiguous definition has led lower courts as well as later supreme courts to cite Moore for a
conjunctive standard, e.g., Olsen v. Winter Park Racquet Club, 142 So. 2d 5, 7-8 (Fla. 1962);
Hillside Sod Farms, Inc. v. Duckworth, Indus. Rel. Comm'n Order 2-3838 (June 8, 1979), as
well as an alternative standard, e.g., Hill, 260 So. 2d at 195; WFLA v. Deal, Indus. Rel.
Comm'n Order 2-3225 (Sept. 8, 1977).
24. 143 Fla. at 105, 196 So. at 496. The decedent was the manager of a 24-hour automobile
parts service which required him to be on call at all times. Apparently the claimant and his
wife were at the claimant's place of business when he left to drive her home. The court
found the fact that he was on call at all times immaterial since he was not responding to a
business call. Id. Seven months later in Sweat v. Allen, 145 Fla. 733, 200 So. 348 (1941), the
court cited the Moore standard, and compensated a deputy sheriff who was hit by a truck
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court held he was on a personal mission at the time of his death. His widow,
therefore, could not collect workers' compensation benefits because his death
neither arose out of nor was in the course of his employment.2 5
Following the Moore decision, the court handed down Bituminous Casualty
Corp. v. Richardson,26 departing from its previous holding by giving the test
its traditional conjunctive construction.7 The court then explained that the
first prong, "arising out of employment," related to causation whereas the
second prong, "in the course of employment," referred to the time, place and
circumstances of the accident. 28 The claimant was walking back to his employer's truck after retrieving his wind-blown hat when he was struck by a
passing automobile.2 9 The court concluded recovering the hat was incidental
0
to employment and thus both prongs of the conjunctive test were satisfied3
31
In Suniland Toys & Juvenile Furniture,Inc. v. Karns, decided in 1963,
the supreme court did not articulate its interpretation of the statute as conjunctive or disjunctive; however, it did emphasize the fundamental requirewhile walking to work. Although the deputy's regular duties were inside the county jail, the
fact the deputy was under oath to keep the peace and apprehend criminals 24 hours each day
brought the injury within the course of his employment even though it occurred before
normal working hours. Id. at 736-37, 200 So. at 350. The "going and coming xule" generally
precludes compensation for injuries received while going to or coming from work, but the
policemen's exception is still in force in Florida. See Warg v. City of Miami Springs, 249 So. 2d
3 (Fla. 1971). In Hi-Acres, Inc. v. Pierce, 73 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 1954), the supreme court distinguished between employees who are on duty at all times and those who are only subject
to call. The court stated that if an employee responds to a call, he ceases to be protected by
workers' compensation once he completes the mission for his employer. 73 So. 2d at 49.
25. 143 Fla. at 105, 196 So. at 496. The instant court noted decisions of other jurisdictions
holding injuries received while on personal missions noncompensable. Florida cases still hold
that if a claimant is injured while on a personal errand, the injury is not compensable. See,
e.g., Heath v. Thomas Lumber Co., 140 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 1962); Florsheim Shoe Co. v. Asberry,
Indus. Rel. Comm'n Order 2-3234 (Sept. 22, 1977).
26. 148 Fla. 323, 4 So. 2d 378 (1941).
27. Id. at 325, 4 So. 2d at 379. The supreme court first articulated a conjunctive construction in Travelers Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 147 la. 210, 213, 3 So. 2d 381, 383 (1941). The Taylor
court relied heavily on the early Illinois case Mueller Constr. Co. v. Industrial Bd., 283 Ill.
148, 118 N.E. 1028 (1918), but did not explain the conjunctive standard as fully as the
Richardson court did.
28. 148 Fla. at 325, 4 So. 2d at 379. The court adopted the explanation of the conjunctive
construction used by the Illinois supreme court in Scholl v. Industrial Comm'n, 366 Ill. 588,
591, 10 N.E.2d 360, 362 (1937).
29. Richardson was a laborer who helped load and unload crates of citrus onto a truck
and later into a warehouse. 148 Fla. at 324, 4 So. 2d at 378. As the claimant was riding in an
open truck from the groves to the warehouse his hat blew off. Id.
30. Id. at 325, 4 So. 2d at 378-79. Believing Richardson "did the only thing that [a]
reasonable [man] would have done under the circumstances," the court classified this particular errand as incidental to employment and not a personal mission. Id. Comparing the
facts to a worker getting a drink of water, the court explained that the accident does not
have to occur while the employee is actually working; it is sufficient if the injury occurs
while he is doing something incidental to his employment. Therefore, the "in the course of
employment" requirement was satisfied. The court explained the injury had the requisite
causal connection to the employee's job because retrieving his hat was sufficiently connected
to his employment. Id. at 325, 4 So. 2d at 378.
31. 148 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 1963).
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ment from Moore that an injury must have originated in a risk connected with
employment to be compensable.3 2 The claimant, who had been exposed to a
contaminated water supply while at work, had an allergic reaction to a typhoid
innoculation administered during business hours.3 3 Since her injury resulted
from a risk she had been exposed to solely during employment, the claimant
3 4

was compensated.

Returning to the disjunctive definition of Moore, the supreme court, in Hill
v. Gregg, Gibson & Gregg, Inc.,3 5 apparently overruled the long line of cases
casting the test as a two-prong, conjunctive one. 36 In Hill, the petitioner became
involved in a heated discussion with a supervisor before working hours.37 The
argument ended with the employee's dismissal, but before he could leave the
premises the superintendent attacked him. 38 Admonishing the lower courts

against using Moore as authority for a conjunctive standard, the supreme court
explained that Moore stood for a disjunctive test of work connectedness.3 9

32. Id. at 524.
33. Id. Returning to work after a hurricane, the claimant drank the only water available
at her place of employment which may have been contaminated due to the storm. Her employer had not warned her of the possible contamination, and she had not been exposed to
contaminated water anywhere except at work. Her employer's landlord arranged for those
exposed to the water to receive typhoid innoculations during working hours at the office of a
private physician. Id.
34. Focusing on general causal connection, the court did not differentiate between "arising
out of" and "in the course of employment." The supreme court held the claimant's injury
arose from a risk sufficiently connected to her employment since she was exposed to the risk
only while at work. Id.
Looking to the decisions of other jurisdictions for support, the court found there was a
general trend to award compensation in cases of innoculation injuries. While there was no
consistent rationale for compensating the victims of such accidents, the decisions were usually
predicated on mutual advantage between employer and employee: employers wanted to
minimize workers' compensation claims and employees wanted to protect themselves from
disability. Id. at 525.
35. 260 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1972).
36. The court did not expressly overrule prior cases casting the test as conjunctive, but
its explicit interpretation of the Moore standard as disjunctive rendered the conjunctive construction apparently lifeless. Id. at 195.
37. The petitioner and his retarded son worked for the respondent at different job sites.
About an hour before work the petitioner went to the project superintendent's office several
miles from his own job site to inquire about his son's wages. Id. at 194.
38. The discussion turned into a heated argument and the superintendent dismissed both
petitioner and his son. As the petitioner was leaving the premises, the superintendent assaulted
the petitioner, resulting in the injury for which he sought compensation. Id.
39. Id. at 194-95. The judge of industrial claims denied the claimant's plea for compensation, holding that since the attack occurred several miles from his job site and before working hours, the injury did not arise out of nor was it in the course of the claimant's employment. Additionally, since the claimant was engaged in a personal mission when the injury
occurred, he was not covered under workers' compensation. Id. The Industrial Relations
Commission affirmed the judgment of the judge of industrial claims determining that the
claimant was not benefitting his employer. Id. After explaining the decisions of the lower
courts, the supreme court quoted the operative language from Moore, and emphasized that
the definition created alternatives. See note 23 supra. Concluding that the lower courts had
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Reasoning that an employee's discharge is an integral part of the employment
relationship, the court concluded the claimant's injury had the requisite connection to his employment and was accordingly compensable. 0
Recently, in Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. McCook41 the
court returned to the conjunctive standard it had adopted in Richardson.42 An
employee whose back injury occurred during a work break was denied compensation because the ailment resulted from a congenital defect. 43 The supreme
court rebuked the judge of industrial claims and the Industrial Relations
Commission for following the disjunctive standard, explaining that a conjunctive construction was mandated by the statute.44
In the instant case, the supreme court's goal was to clarify and to establish

a definitive construction of the statute. Reviewing the decisions since the statute's enactment, the court recognized the chaos created by the two lines of
cases that had evolved. 45 Determined to resolve this controversy, the supreme
court abandoned its past decisions and considered the suggestion of an influ-

only applied the fourth Moore definition, the supreme court determined that the other three
definitions must also be considered since "[a]ll are alternatives." 260 So. 2d at 195.
40. 260 So. 2d at 195. The court found that the fact the incident occurred before regular
working hours was immaterial. Once the superintendent began discharging the petitioner, an
"employment-related situation" was created for workers' compensation purposes. Id. Relying
on I A. LaPsON, supra note 8, §26.00, the court went on to hold that even though petitioner's
injury occurred after he had been discharged, compensation was due since former employees
are given an opportunity to leave the premises in safety. 260 So. 2d at 195.
41. 355 So. 2d 1166 (Fla. 1977).
42. Id. at 1168. The court stated that there are three separate elements to the workers'
compensation coverage formula: by accident, arising out of employment, and in the course of
employment. All three must be proven to award compensation. Specifically referring to
Richardson for authority, the court adopted a conjunctive construction of the statute. Id. at
1167-68.
43. Id. at 1169. Though the diamant's congenital abnormality was triggered while at
work, any similar movement may have resulted in the injury. Citing Richardson and Karns,
the court acknowledged a "universal principle of workmen's compensation law that an idiopathic condition which results in injury to the worker does not 'arise out of' employment
unless the employment in some way contributes to the risk or aggravates the injury." Id. at
1168. The fact the claimant's condition surfaced during working hours in no way connects
the injury to her employment. Consequently, the claimant's injury failed to satisfy the
"arising out of employment" requirement of the statute. Id. at 1168-69.
44. Id, at 1169. Since workers' compensation is not intended to be general health insurance,
see note 18 and accompanying text, supra, the court concluded that to award compensation
when an idiopathic condition happens to surface during the course of employment would be
a judicial repeal of the statutory requirement "arising out of employment." 355 So. 2d at
1168-69.
45. 383 So. 2d at 625. Originating with Moore, one line of cases held an injury compensable if it either "arose out of employment" or occurred "in the course of employment." See
note 23 and accompanying text, supra. Moore's progeny, especially Karns and Hill, have
focused more upon "originating in the course of employment" rather than "occurring in the
course of employment." See generally notes 32-40 and accompanying text, supra. In opposition to this disjunctive construction was Richardson and later cases holding that "arising out
of employment" and "in the course of employment" must be separately proven. See notes
26-30 &41-44 and accompanying text, supra.
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ential text writer 46 as well as the construction other jurisdictions have given
identical statutory language when dealing with similar situations.47
The court first examined the proposal of Professor Larson, the author of a
widely recognized treatise on workers' compensation. 48 Acknowledging the
basic goal of workers' compensation, to indemnify injured workers for injury
sustained as the result of risks inherent in employment, 49 the court agreed with
Larson that the primary consideration when handling workers' compensation
claims is the origin of the risk causing the injury 0 Larson argued that this
consideration may be best reflected by construing "arising" to denote originating and to modify "in the course of employment" in addition to "out of employment."' 51 The resulting standard, arising out of employment and arising in
the course of employment, allows compensation for "delayed-action" injuries,
which are injuries originating in some risk of employment but occurring out5
side working hours or off the employment premises. ?
After acknowledging the validity of Larson's reasoning, 53 the supreme court
studied the opinions of courts which have adopted the type of test advocated
46.

Professor Larson is generally recognized as an authority on workers' compensation and

courts frequently refer to his treatise,

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW.

See notes 54-55 & 59-62

and accompanying text, infra.
47. 383 So. 2d at 625-28.
48. Id. at 625-26.
49. Id. at 626.
50. Id. For a fuller discussion see note 71 and accompanying text, supra.
51. IA A. LARSON, supra note 8, §29.22 at 5-378. This construction focuses on causation.
The emphasis is thus shifted from the time and place of the accident to the time and place
of causation. "The time-bomb, so to speak, is constructed and started ticking during working
hours; but it happens to go off at a time and place remote from the employment." Id. at
5-376.
52. The term "delayed-action" injury was coined by Larson. Id. §29.20. Arguing that the
risks inherent in employment can result in injury off the employment premises, Larson asserts
that injustice results from requiring the injury to occur during working hours. There is no
single class of cases in which the basic purposes of compensation law have so far miscarried
as in these 'delayed-injury' cases." Id. §29.21, at 5-360. To support this contention, Larson
recites fact situations where recovery has been denied. For example, in Barnes v. Panero, 238
A.2d 608 (Del. 1968), the claimant was a bartender who became involved in an argument with
a customer while at work. About one hour later, while the claimant was at home, the upset
customer threw a whiskey bottle at the claimant, resulting in the loss of an eye. The court
held that the claimant was not injured while in the course of his employment, therefore the
injury was not compensable. The Supreme Court of Delaware recognized that some might
suggest the result was inequitable, but placed responsibility for the result with the legislature.
Id. at 609. An example outside the assault category is American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Steel, 229
S.W.2d 386 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950). There, a riveter got steel shavings in his hair and eyebrows
and left work with some of these shavings still clinging to him. About 15 minutes after leaving
the employment premises a steel sliver fell into the claimant's eye, resulting in serious injury.
Id. at 388. Citing strike situations as the most common circumstances surrounding "delayedaction" assaults, Larson notes that the assault occurs solely because the employee did his job.
IA A. LARSON, supra note 8, §29.21, at 5-361. "From the employer's point of view, if there
ever was a time when an employee deserved compensation for his injuries, it is when the
employee, at considerable personal risk, remains on the job to minimize the deterioration of
plant and other loss being suffered by the employer. Yet until recently, apart from special
circumstances, the course-of-employment obstacle has usually been found insurmountable." Id.
53. 383 So. 2d at 625-26, 628.
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by Larson.

4

The instant court fully subscribed to the Supreme Court of Vir-

ginia's interpretation of Larson's proposed test. 5 The Virginia court distinguished the two elements of the test, thereby allaying fears that the judiciary
was fusing the two statutory requirements "arising out of" and "in the course
of."56 It was then explained that the "course of employment" requirement
referred to "continuity of time, space and circumstances"5 7 and could only be
' 8
satisfied by showing a "single work-related inddent."
The instant court noted that its adopted test set no time limitations between
incident and injury beyond which compensation could not be granted. 59 The

court emphasized, however, the close continuity required to compensate "delayed-action" injuries.

similar

case, 61

0

As the New York Court of Appeals stated in a very

there must be strong evidence to indicate that the assailant's

54. Id. at 626-28.
55. The instant court adopted the explanation given the statute by the Supreme Court of
Virginia in Graybeal v. Board of Supervisors, 216 Va. 77, 216 S.E.2d 52 (1975), almost word
for word. 383 So. 2d at 627-28. Compare the instant case with Graybeal, 216 Va. at 78, 216
S.E.2d at 54. In Graybeal, the claimant, a county prosecutor, was injured by a bomb planted
in front of his home by a paroled felon he had prosecuted for murder. 216 Va. at 79-80, 216
S.E.2d at 54.
56. 216 Va. at 80, 216 S.E.2d at 54. Affirming prior case law, the Supreme Court of Virginia reiterated the conjunctive construction of the statute. However the Virginia court rejected its prior holding in Conner v. Bragg, 203 Va. 204, 123 S.E.2d 393 (1962), that an employee must be actually engaged in his employment to be compensated for an injury. Since
injustice would occur under the facts presented in Graybeal if a strict interpretation of the
statute were applied, the Virginia court accepted Larson's suggestion and opted for a modified
rule emphasizing origin of the cause of the injury. 216 Va. at 79-80, 216 S&E.2d at 54.
57. 216 Va. at 80, 216 S.E.2d at 54.
58. 216 Va. at 80, 216 S.E.2d at 54. The Virginia court explained that the continuity element of its adopted test "must be satisfied by a showing of an unbroken course beginning with
work and ending with injury under such circumstances that the beginning and the end are
connected parts of a single work-related incident." Id.
59. 383 So. 2d at 627. In addition to Graybeal v. Board of Supervisors, 216 Va. 77, 216
S.E.2d 52 (1975), where the cause of the accident and the actual occurrence of the injury
were separated by years, the instant court noted Thornton v. Chamberlain Mfg. Corp., 62
N.J. 235, 300 A.2d 146 (1973). In that case, the Supreme Court of New Jersey, using Larson's
test, compensated a foreman who lost his right eye when he was assaulted by a disgruntled
former co-worker nine days after the claimant had terminated his own employment. The New
Jersey court held the nine day interval immaterial. The court explained that the statutory test
should be interpreted broadly to reflect the legislature's intent to transfer to business those
accident costs reasonably related to it. Id. at 238, 242, 300 A.2d at 147, 149. See also notes 55
& 56 supra.

60. The instant court explained that compensation of "delayed-action" injuries has been
limited to situations where the "fact that originated the cause of the injury occurred entiiely within the time and space limits of employment." 383 So. 2d at 627.
61. In Malacarne v. City of Yonkers Parking Auth., 41 N.Y.2d 189, 391 N.Y.S2d 402, 359
N.E.2d 992 (1976), the New York Court of Appeals applied and discussed the continuity element of their test for work connectedness. The continuity component was first promulgated
by Justice Cardozo in Field v. Charmette Knitted Fabric Co., 245 N.Y. 139, 156 N.E. 642 (1927).
In Field, Justice Cardozo held that "the line of division is drawn too narrowly and closely
when circumstances of place are thus considered to the exclusion of all others." Id. at 142, 156
N.E. at 643. Justice Cardozo went on to say that "continuity of cause has been so combined
with contiguity in time and space that the quarrel from origin to ending must be taken as
one." Id.
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mistaken belief the claimant was carrying the employer's money originated
62
from the time and place of employment.
After consideration of these authorities, the instant court distinguished the
two elements of the statutory test of work connectedness and held they must
both be satisfied to permit compensation.63 In addition to the traditional construction that "arising out of" referred to causation, the court explained that
"in the course of employment" meant continuity of time, space and circumstances and could be satisfied by showing the factors causing the injury occurred during the time and space limits of employment.6 4 Applying this test to
the facts at hand, the court compensated the claimant, stressing the close continuity displayed between the claimant's employment and her injury.65 The
instant court emphasized that the claimant had produced strong evidence to
show her assailant derived his erroneous belief that she carried the cafeteria's
money while she was actually working; her assailant was on her employer's
premises shortly before the assault and had followed her to the place of injury. 66
In Malacarne, a parking lot attendant, who usually deposited the day's receipts in a bank
across the street from the parking lot, was killed outside his sister's home by an assailant allegedly demanding the "money bag." 41 N.Y.2d at 190-91, 391 N.Y.S.2d at 404-05, 359 N.E.2d
at 993-94.
62. 383 So. 2d at 627. In Malacarne v. City of Yonkers Parking Auth., 41 N.Y.2d 189, 391
N.Y.S.2d 402, 359 N.E.2d 992 (1976), the court held the money bag statement, was insufficient
to connect the decedent's death to his employment, see note 61, supra. The New York court
indicated the type of evidence required by stating: "[t]hat bare statement did not include, for
instance, anything to indicate that suspicious persons had been lurking in the vicinity of the
parking lot, or that anyone had been seen to follow the decedent from there or, for that
matter, that he had observed anyone following him at any time during his half hour's drive
to his sister's house until he had arrived on her street." 41 N.Y.2d at 196, 391 N.Y.S.2d at
407-08, 359 N.E.2d at 997. The court then stated that with no such evidence it could only
speculate how and why the assailant came to the incorrect belief the decedent was carrying
his employer's money. Id. Comparing the decedent's employment to other jobs requiring
handling money and short trips to make deposits, the court explained that such employees
cannot be compensated under workers' compensation if they are attacked away from work by
predators hoping they have their employer's money. Id. at 197, 391 N.Y.S.2d at 409, 359 N.E.2d
at 998.
Larson deprecated the strict view of continuity enunciated by the New York court. IA
A. LARSON, supra note 8,§29.21 at 5-365-70. Larson explained that "the crucial fact is not the
locus or time of the assailant's acquiring of an impression, but the nature of the occupation
itself as giving the impression of handling money." Id. at 5-367. Since the money bag statement was not given to the authorities until a year and a half after the shooting, Larson suggested the real basis for the Court of Appeals' holding is that it simply did not believe the
belated testimony. Id. at 5-369.
63. 383 So. 2d at 628. The instant court cited Moore and Hill as the Florida case law
foundation for a two-pronged test of work connectedness. However, as the supreme court
observed, Moore and Hill apparently espoused a more unitary standard of work connectedness.
Id. at 624-25. The court's reference to Moore and Hill may have been alluding to the similar
primary focus on causation shared by Moore, Hill and the instant case. See notes 23 & 39 and
accompanying text, supra.
64. 383 So. 2d at 628.
65. Id. The instant court dismissed the first element of the test for work connectedness
stating that it was plain the claimant's injury arose out of her employment. Id.
66. Id. The instant court apparently applied the strict interpretation of continuity as
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Through its decision in the instant case, the supreme court has approached

its goal of clarity and certainty in defining the scope of workers' compensation.
In light of the confused history of the work connectedness standard in Florida,67
the court astutely placed its primary reliance on Larson's nationally recognized
interpretation." Further dependence upon either the conjunctive or disjunctive construction of the statute alone may have led to continued uncertainty
since the court has oscillated between the two standards in the past.69 Considering the purposes of workers' compensation,70 the facts presented by the
instant case reveal the inadequacies of the court's previous constructions. 1 An
injury caused solely by a claimant's employment is not compensable under the
Richardson conjunctive standard if it occurs after working hours because the
accident did not befall the employee within the traditional definition of "in
the course of employment." 72 The disjunctive standard enunciated in Moore
can be equally unjust, since it could allow compensation for an injury totally

unconnected with the claimant's work if the accident happened to occur during his hours of employment.7 3 The test adopted by the principal court focuses
promulgated by the New York Court of Appeals in Malacarne. Even under a narrow conception of continuity, however, the facts presented by the instant case are very strong since the

claimant's assailant followed her home after loitering on the employment premises.
67. The supreme court itself recognized the confused history of the work connectedness
standard. See note 45 and accompanying text, supra.
68. See note 46 and accompanying text, supra.
69. While the supreme court could have definitively held either of its past constructions,
conjunctive or disjunctive, to be correct, the confused history of the two interpretations may
have led to further questions. Doubt may still remain in the minds of some as to the finality
of the court's choice. Therefore, support from other jurisdictions increased the conclusiveness
of the instant decision.
70. The goals of workers' compensation are to relieve the plight of the injured worker
and his family as efficiently as possible, see notes 13 & 16 and accompanying text, supra, to
promote economic efficiency, see notes 80-83 and accompanying text, infra, and to reduce
accident costs, see notes 75-79 and accompanying text, infra.
71. "The basic difficulty... lies in the inappropriateness of the 'course of employment'
test itself. The phrase serves well enough in respondeatsuperior cases, since there is always
some act or omission by the servant which can be identified as having taken place within or
without the scope of employment. But in Workmen's Compensation the controlling event is
something done to, not by the employee, and since the real question is whether this something
was an industrial accident, the origin of the accident is crucial, and the moment of manifestation should be immaterial." IA A. L.AZsON, supra note 8, §29.22 at 5-375. The standard of
work connectedness should focus on the origin of the cause, since that is the relevant criterion
in evaluating workers' compensation claims.
72. The traditional definition of "in the course of employment" is "that the injury must
occur within the period of employment, at a place where the employee may reasonably be,
and while he is reasonably fulfilling the duties of his employment or engaged in doing something incidental to it." Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N.Y. v. Moore, 143 Fla. 103, 105, 196 So. 495,
496 (1940). Since a conjunctive construction of the statute requires proof of "in the course of
employment," the test does not focus solely on causation and therefore results in inequitable
judgments. See IA A. LARsON, supra note 8, §29.00-.22.
73. While the disjunctive standard may be an effective method of sidestepping the "in
the course of employment" requirement, it could allow a court to focus on spacial and
temporal links to employment instead of concentrating solely on causation and thus is inadequate. See generally IA A. L.tsoN, supra note 8, §29.00-.22. Since inequitable results
occur if considerations of time and place are allowed to determine compensability, the supreme
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on the time and place of causation, rather than the time and place of injury74
The economic theory justifying liability without fault as the most efficient
method to relieve financial hardships caused by industrial accidents is accurately reflected by this decision. If an industry bears the costs of the accidents
it causes, 75 the incentive to reduce costs 6 will compel the industry to make its
processes safer to its workers,7 thereby reducing the number and severity of
accidents.' 5 In addition to reducing the total costs of accidents, placing the cost
of workers' injuries on the industry may promote a desirable allocation of
resources. 7 9 To maintain a profit, the industry will attempt to shift the cost of
workers' accidents placed on it by workers' compensation to the consumer by
increasing prices1 ° Only if all the costs required to produce a product are included in the price to consumers, can aggregate purchasing decisions determine
the total quantity of production desired . 8s To achieve this optimum allocation
of resources, the cost of work-related accidents must be borne by the industry

court has used a conjunctive standard when injuries are suffered during work but have no
causal connection to employment. See Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. v. McCook, 355 So. 2d 1166
(Fla. 1977); Foxworth v. Florida Indus. Comm'n, 86 So. 2d 147 (Fla. 1956); Travelers Ins. Co.
v. Taylor, 147 Fla. 210, 3 So. 2d 381 (1941).
74. IA A. LARSON, supra note 8, §29.22 at 5-375.
75. A basic tenet of workers' compensation is the inevitability of industrial accidents;
therefore, accident costs are simply another cost of production similar to labor and materials.
See H. SoMERs, supra note 13, at 26-27.
76. If an industry is not bearing the cost of its workers' accidents, there is no incentive
for the industry to reduce accident costs. In fact, it may be that the reason for the slow adaptation of the common law to the needs of injured workers was the desire to promote industry.
To illustrate, if a certain number of accidents are normally incurred in manufacturing a
product, the cost of the accidents are in a sense necessary to produce the product. If the
business does not pay for these costs then the price of its product does not reflect all the necessary costs of production. Consequently, demand may be greater than it would be under a
system distributing accident costs to industry due to the artificially-low price, thereby stimulating industrial activity.
77. The inherent drive to reduce costs in order to receive or maintain a profit can only
be used to reduce accident costs if each industry is bearing the cost of the accidents it causes.
Theoretically, in the absence of transaction costs the same amount of accident reduction would
occur wherever the cost is placed. See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & EcoN. 1
(1960). Since employers have cheaper transaction costs than employees, however, they are in a
better position to reduce accident costs. See G. CALABRESI, supra note 16, at 135-73.
78. This goal can be described as primary cost avoidance. Unfortunately, this goal conflicts with the goal of loss spreading. To further spread the risk of loss, accident costs are
allocated throughout an industry by insurance. Consequently, the incentive to reduce accident
costs is not as great on the individual enterprise because the rest of the industry absorbs part
of the cost. See generally G. CALABRESI, supra note 16, at 68-94.
79. See G. CALABRESI, supra note 16, at 69-73, 78-88.
80. One of the reasons accident costs are placed on industry is the belief that industry will
be able to pass accident costs on to the consumer, thus making the consumer the ultimate
insurer of industrial accidents. See Protectu Awning Shutter Co. v. Cline, 154 Fla. 30, 16 So. 2d
342 (1944); G. CALABRESs, supra note 16, at 50-54.
81. In effect, a certain number of accidents are unavoidable because safer methods are
simply too expensive. G. CALABRESI, supra note 16, at 17-18. Consumers should be made aware
of accident costs so that aggregate purchasing can determine the number of accidents desired.
See G. CALABRsi, supra note 16, at 69-73.
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whose risks caused the accident.8 2 Since these concepts apply to causation and

not time or place of the injury, the supreme court's adoption of a standard
concentrating on causation is consistent with these precepts.
To relieve the plight of the injured worker and to promote economic
efficiency, Florida's compensation plan seeks to administer prompt benefits as
efficiently as possible. An unambiguous statutory test of causation is imperative
if these goals are to be achieved.

3

If it is unclear which accidents are covered

by workers' compensation, litigation costs destroy the efficient administration
desired. 8'

Although the supreme court's holding in the principal case goes far toward
resolving the issue, its attempt to erect boundaries for its adopted test may have
left room for further litigation. 5 The court's reliance on the continuity of time,
space and circumstances,8 s raises questions as to the degree of continuity required. By its approval of the reasoning behind the continuity requirement,7
and by its emphasis on the extremely close continuity exemplified by the facts
of the instant case, the supreme court has apparently adopted a strict interpretation of this new element. On the other hand, the court also relied on Larson,
who advocates a liberal view of continuity 88 Thus an element of uncertainty
remains. Whether "delayed-action" injuries will be limited to facts similar to
those presented by the instant case or extended to situations where proof of
continuity is weaker is an issue for the Deputy Commissioners and First District

82. Resources, labor and capital, are deployed where they are demanded. For example, if
consumers demand more cars, then more labor and capital will be used to produce cars. If
each product reflects all its costs, then aggregate purchasing can compare the relative desirability of one product with all other products thereby shifting resources to produce the
amount of each product society desires. See G. CALABRSM, supra note 16, at 69-73, 78-88.
83. These goals have been thwarted by high costs. See Sadowski, supra note 14, at 641.
"Upon examination, one finds that these high costs are the result of litigation which in turn
is the result of benefits payable on the basis of guesses." Id. at 642. Although Florida's system
of workers' compensation was intended to be a self-executing system, the level of litigation in
Florida is higher than in most states. Id. at 649-50.
84. Id.
85. While there will no longer be a question of what standard of work connectedness to

use, a factual determination of the degree of continuity is left to the lower courts. Larson
suggests that the continuity theory promulgated by Justice Cardozo in Field v. Charmette
Knitted Fabric Co., 245 N.Y. 139, 156 N.E. 642 (1927), is sufficiently elastic, if construed
broadly, to avoid the inequity occasioned by the "in the course of employment" requirement.
IA A. LAwoN, supranote 8, §29.21, at 5-364.
86. See notes 55-58 and accompanying text, supra.
87. See notes 60-62 and accompanying text, supra.
88. Having placed its imprimatur upon Malacarne v. City of Yonkers Parking Auth., 41
N.Y.2d 189, 391 N.Y.S.2d 402, 359 N.E.2d 992 (1976), the instant court has apparently adopted
the strict construction of continuity espoused therein. As an alternative analysis, Larson suggests that in cases where the after-hours assault cannot be directly traced to some event
occurring within the period of employment, the assault may be more aptly considered in the
category of inherently dangerous occupations than with "delayed-action" injuries. IA A. LARsoN, supra note

8, §29.21, at 5-365-69.
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Court of Appeal. 9 If this uncertainty results in controversy, the supreme court
may need to further explain the instant decision. 0
The supreme court in the principal case has attempted to do what the
legislature should have done many years ago: adopt a more sophisticated construction of the statute. The court has acted to further the substantive goals of
the Workers' Compensation Act and to enhance the efficiency of its administration by adopting a clearer standard focusing on causation rather than temporal
and spacial issues. The supreme court is to be lauded for its decision in the
instant case but only time will tell if its work is done.
DANIEL DECUBELLIS
89. The judges of industrial claims have been renamed deputy commissioners and the
First District Court of Appeal, now hears all workers' compensation appeals. See note 7, supra.
90. Since there may be an inherent factual determination in any standard of causation,
the supreme court may have intended the lower courts to determine continuity on a case by
case basis. By generating case law on the issue, the supreme court may be in a better position
to determine whether greater clarity is needed and if so the court will have a more crystallized
issue to decide.
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